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CONTEXT SENSITIVITY BY 
DEVELOPMENT INGOS IN MYANMAR 
Anthony Ware 
Myanmar is a difficult country for international non-government 
organizations (INGOs) to operate in effectively. It has significant 
humanitarian needs but the domestic and international political 
environments hamper effective assistance. On the one hand, agencies 
working in Myanmar face a sometimes obstructive, and often inept, 
authoritarian government which is suspicious of both their motives and 
those of international donor governments. On the other hand, aid and 
development resources and mandates are heavily restricted by international 
donors disturbed by allegations of human rights violations and concerned 
that satisfactory policy preconditions for macro-economic development are 
not in place. This is a "complex political and bureaucratic environment" 
(ICG 2008), a "politically delicate situation" (CEC 2007), in which the 
tension in Myanmar's relations with the international community is as 
large a contributor to the difficulty in delivering humanitarian assistance 
as Myanmar's domestic policy, capability, and will. The result for INGOs 
is restrictions on access, funding, and mandates. 
This chapter presents analysis of new primary research data collected 
from INGOs working inside Myanmar between 2009 and mid-2011. 
In particular, it looks at their contextualization of common development 
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approaches in order to maximize programme effectiveness. The key finding 
is that INGOs believe that although operating in Myanmar is difficult, their 
effectiveness is not as heavily restricted as is commonly perceived by people 
outside the country, provided they deploy appropriate sensitivity to the 
operational context. This is particularly true for activities that address the 
impact of extreme poverty in communities, but also applies in areas such 
as advocacy and capacity-building for the emerging civil society. 
There have been many studies of Myanmar politics, and of the pros 
and cons of sanctions, but while this body of research often mentions 
the humanitarian impact of the political stalemate, few studies examine 
INGO effectiveness or how INGOs adapt to attempt poverty alleviation 
in Myanmar. This research goes well beyond previous studies by Inwood 
(2008), Igboemeka (2005), and Duffield (2008), presenting analysis of a 
much larger number of more recent primary interviews within Myanmar. 
I have previously presented findings from this research regarding the 
ways INGOs create space to operate in spite of Myanmar government 
restrictions and the restrictions imposed by the international community 
on funding and mandates (Ware 2011). Without covering this ground again, 
this chapter explores how INGOs contextualize their implementation of 
international development principles to be most sensitive to the particular 
circumstances in Myanmar. (A more detailed presentation of these findings 
has also recently been published; see Ware 2012.) 
The remainder of this chapter presents the results of this fieldwork 
with INGOs in Myanmar. The first section explores the ways INGOs 
contextualize their relationships with other development stakeholders, 
including officials, donors,. and civil socie~ through consideration of ideas 
on partnerships, capacity-building, rights-based approaches, advocacy, 
and accountability. The following section considers the ways INGOs 
work sensitively in local communities according to ideas of participation,. 
equity, sustainability, and active citizenship. The chapter ends with some 
conclusions from this research. 
CONTEXT SENSITIVITY IN RELATIONS WITH 
OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 
Partnership and Capacity Building -
with Civil Society and NGOs 
It has long been recognized that INGOs need to move from being 
service providers to being equal partners with civil society in facilitating 
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development (Paldron 1987). Strengthening civil society is essential for 
promoting self-help and for overcoming both paternalism and dependency 
(Frantz 19S7). As a result, capacity-building and local organizational 
development are primary objectives for many development agencies 
globally (Pettit 2000). 
However, a good many INGOs who ascribe to this ethos globally, in 
Myanmar still implement most of their programmes directly through paid 
staff. For example, while the global practice of Care International is to 
minimize the number of their own staff and work primarily through local 
partners, in Myanmar they have a large staff, and directly implement 95 
per cent of their programmes (Agland, Care 2009). Care International is 
not alone. Medecins du Monde, as another example, directly implement 
projects in Myanmar to an extent they would not do in other countries, using 
international staff to run their own HIV I AIDS clinics and programmes. 
We absolutely want to build local capacity of local NGOs, CBO, informal 
groups, whatever ... And we would like to do hospital cooperation .. . 
[But for now] we are operating as if we are in an emergency situation .. . 
(Lancelot MDM 2009). 
Many INGOs in Myanmar would prefer to focus on technical cooperation 
or building the capacity of local NGOs, as they do in other countries, but 
the limiting factor is the lack of capacity of local NGOs in terms of scale, 
governance, and abilities such as evaluation skills. Some organizations, such 
as Oxfam, ActionAid, and the Burnet Institute, for example, have made 
conscious decisions to implement almost all their programmes through local 
partnerships and to build local capacity rather than coming in themselves 
from outside, but developing a shared culture, ideals, and beliefs takes 
time, and the progress of their programmes is much slower. 
A common criticism made by local NGOs is that where large INGOs 
do form partnerships with local organizations, they often "see the local 
partners as their implementers, not in any sense of true partnership" 
(Darning, Burnet 2009). They have a fear that large international agencies 
will roll over the really good local initiatives that stem from local civil 
society, using the local organizations simply to implement their own 
programmes. Oxfam deals with this in part by working with a range of 
/'project partners", while focussing on developing more significantly the 
capacity of innovative "strategy partners" (Win, Oxfam 2009). 
The capacity and development of civil society in Myanmar has long 
been constrained by government policy (ICG 2001; Liddell1997; Steinberg 
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1997). However, over the last five to ten years a very active civil society has 
emerged at what many describe as below-the-radar level: not registered, 
not big, but very active (Lancelot, MDM 2009; Lorch 2007). Th,~ response 
to Cyclone Nargis clearly demonstrated the resurgence of this "informal" 
civil society (CPCS 2008), and since Nargis there has been a large push 
for partnerships between local and international implementation agencies 
(Darning, Burnett 2009). Identifying and building the capacity of potential 
partner organizations has therefore become a high priority, with the greatest 
challenges for most INGOs being to find suitable candidates and build 
the organizational capacity of unregistered organizations, rather than to 
develop technical skills. 
The fact that most local organizations are not registered is an 
additional obstacle to partnerships. Partnering with smaller unregistered 
organizations is tricky: "you find funding but you have to carry it for 
them since institutional donors will not take the risk of investing money 
in a group that is not registered, that is not controllable" (Lancelot, 
MDM 2009). Nonetheless, Burmese nationals and local NGOs that were 
interviewed indicated that they definitely want to see more of these 
capacity-building partnerships. 
Partnership and Capacity Building -with Officials 
Building the capacity of government agencies and departments, and 
strengthening state institutions and civil service, are widely seen as 
essential for sustained economic development (see, for example, ESCAP I 
ADB /UNDP 2007). A few UN agencies, such as the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), have sufficient mandate and a relationship that is 
good enough to partner with and build capacity in Myanmar government 
departments (Imai, FAO 2009), but most agencies, whether UN or INGO, 
lack such a mandate or funding. 
For most INGOs, any partnership with government officials and 
departments is complex. On the one hand, restrictions applied by donors, 
boards, and the international community to prevent funds flowing to 
persons connected with the regime often include officials down to the 
township (local government) level (Source 1, 2009). On the other hand, 
many officials are deeply suspicious of the motives of INGOs and their 
donors (Source 16; Source 31; Source 50, 2009), or are not interested in 
partnership because they don't want to be controlled by the strings attached 
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to aid (Lancelot~ MOM 2009). Nonetheless~ most respondents suggest that~ 
at least at a township level~ most local authorities are open to partnership 
and assistance. 
Many agencies actively invite township-level officials to training. One 
bilateral donor spoke of their positive experience providing technical 
assistance and training for township-level officials in the fight against 
avian flu. They "found ministries to be very professional and motivated 
... [with] no leakage of money" (Source lf 2009). Nevertheless/ political 
forces on both sides work against partnership. One respondent expressed 
frustration at inequalities they had to perpetrate by not being allowed to 
pay travel expenses for low-paid civil servants to attend training, when 
they do pay these expenses for all other participants (Agland, Care 2009). 
Another found that township officials who were most open and interested 
were quickly moved to another area (Source 24/ 2009). 
One INGO implemented a three-way partnership in a community-
level livelihood programme/ between themselves, a local implementing 
partner, and a government agency (Source 25, 2009). They provided 
funding, strategy, and training, while the local partner handled all direct 
implementation and funding. No funding went to the government, and 
despite the strained nature of such a relationship, they concluded that 
including officials in the partnership promoted healthy dialogue and 
coordination. However, another INGO attempting a similar partnership 
expressed frustration that such approaches almost co-opt local officials 
into INGO projects, rather than generate genuine partnership (Agland~ 
Care 2009). 
Closer partnership with officials requires access to funds with little 
in the way of restrictions, something most organizations don't have. 
The Leprosy Mission International, however, describe in glowing terms 
the positive outcomes they have had partnering with the right officials 
(Griffiths, TLMI 2009). For them it began when Cyclone Nargis struck. 
They quickly realized that the Department of Social Welfare was going 
to be overloaded with administration of new project applications, so they 
rang the department and asked what additional equipment they needed 
to process the administrative mountain they faced. The Leprosy Mission 
International provided computers, printers, photocopiers, and generators. 
While they did this with the motive of ensuring that people with disabilities 
were cared for after the cyclone, they found the strengthened relationship 
most empowering for their work. They were subsequently invited to help 
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write a protection plan for people with disabilities, and to work with the 
department on disability access in Naypyitaw. They have now also been 
asked to help draft disability legislation for the new parliament (Griffiths, 
TLMI 2011). They argue: 
Relationship building often comes through being willing to recognise and 
work with the agendas of other people .... No matter who's in charge of 
the country in the future, the same group of civil servants are going to 
provide these services, so up-skilling and resourcing them is not necessarily 
putting money into the hands of restricted people. And by strengthening 
their hand, it strengthens their ability to do a lot of good things that they 
want to be doing (Griffiths, TLMI 2009). 
Western concerns about corruption in partnership with officials appear 
ill-founded. One source gave a comparison: 
I have had less problems with corruption in Burma than in Laos or 
Thailand .... The problem is mostly with business ... there is definitely 
less corruption when it comes to aid (except exchange rate, big issues) 
because most locals are concerned about the poverty of the people 
(Source 31, 2009). 
One key Burmese worker with a UN agency argued that INGOs finding 
ways to partner with officials is an essential component of facilitating 
the political change the outside world is looking for in Myanmar: 
"We need to allow them to own the changes at the village level. Only 
international agencies can offer that; the local people can't" (Source 41, 
2009). However, building such partnerships requires "more time and 
effort building relationships [with officials] than in other countries" 
(Tumbian, WV 2009). 
Thus, despite the obstacles, many INGOs expressly indicate that if 
they were given more freedom, then partnership and capacity-building 
with officials and government agencies would be something they would 
do more frequently. 
Duffield (2008) argues that the main role of INGOs in Myanmar is 
to "push back, contain or modulate the effects of unchecked, arbitrary 
personal power" by all connected to the regime. Clearly many UN and 
INGO leaders do not agree. Steve Marshall, the ILO Liaison in Myanmar, 
argues that one key obstacle to effective development work in Myanmar is 
the absence of a cohesive civil service which can implement the high-level 
policy initiatives agencies are currently negotiating with senior officials 
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(Marshalt ILO 2009). This view sees building the capacity of the civil service 
as essential. It is clear that restrictions on partnerships with officials cause 
great frustration for many international agencies. Given the emphasis on 
partnerships for poverty alleviation in President Thein Sein' s inauguration 
speech (NLM, 2011) and subsequent signs of policy development around 
this goal (U Myint 2011), INGOs are increasingly thinking that this is the 
right time to explore capacity-building partnerships with the civil service 
(Herzbruch, LRC 2011). 
The danger, of course, in building a close relationship with government 
officials is that "you may be perceived from the outside as being too close; 
you have to tread a fine line" (Source 15, 2009). In talking about this, many 
INGOs/ leaders felt the need to defend themselves against being labelled 
"regime apologists". 
Rights-Based Approach 
The definition of a "Rights-Based Approach" (RBA) to development varies 
greatly, but it usually views poverty as the direct result of disempowerment 
and exclusion, thus seeking to empower rights-holders (citizens) to hold 
duty-bearers (national governments) to account under international human 
rights legislation. In particular, the RBA seeks to assist marginalized poor 
people assert their rights to a fair share of existing resources and power, 
making the process explicitly political (ACFID 2009; Nyamu-Musembi & 
Cornwall2004). 
Given the already highly politicized context, the RBA is a contentious 
topic amongst INGOs in Myanmar. Several organizations interviewed 
have adopted the RBA as their global approach to development1 yet in 
order to "do no harm" and not put people at risk1 until 2011-12 these 
organizations worked in Myanmar in a more reserved way, advocating 
for basic services on behalf of communities, arguing that poverty itself is 
a violation of human rights (for example, Source 24, 2009). The ILO, with 
their mandate to work against forced labour, already spend most of their 
time advising citizens of their rights under existing Myanmar law. They 
suggest that existing national laws provide a reasonable framework in 
many areas, and that raising the awareness of rights under these laws is 
a critical part of development. However, even when people understand 
their legal rights, very few are brave enough to exercise them (Marshall, 
ILO 2009). 
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Many interviewees felt a rights-based approach was not appropriate in 
Myanmar since "the law is in the mouth of the generals; there is nothing 
down on paper, no real rule of law because what is written can always be 
manipulated" (Source 16, 2009). Some see the RBA as built on concepts that 
are not relevant in Myanmar, given that neither the people nor the military 
leaders believe there are rights: "needs and responsibilities yes, but not 
rights" (Tegenfeldt, Hope 2009). Others suggest that many ministers and 
key officials are already" aware of human rights principles, are concerned, 
and are trying to improve on them ... but they have very little budget in 
which to operate ... criticism is not helpful when officials genuinely are 
concerned" (Source 31, 2009). 
Inescapably, part of the issue of talking about rights in Myanmar is the 
fact that the international community regularly couches the most stinging 
of their rebukes in human rights language, to the extent that the Myanmar 
government believes human rights allegations are being exploited to 
destabilize the state, and are being raised for political advantage rather than 
out of genuine humanitarian concern (for example, see NLM 2009). They 
argue that the end result of human rights activism is that the Myanmar 
people are further denied their human rights because of restrictions on the 
right of the country to develop (for example, see Soe Tha 2007). Interestingly, 
Pedersen (2009) agrees in part, suggesting that "poverty has emerged as 
the most acutely felt constraint on human rights for the majority of people 
across the country", thus putting rights obligations in part back on the 
West, not just on the Myanmar government. 
There is a view from at least some local non-government organizations 
(LNGOs) that "instead of advocating for political rights, international 
organizations should start working at the grassroots level strengthening 
the capacity of society" (Source 41, 2009). Overall, those who assess 
their work as most effective believe RBA goals are better pursued by 
building relationships with authorities and appealing for assistance non-
confrontationally, rather than talking about rights and duties. 
Advocacy 
INGOs point to a wide range of policy change and development to show 
that advocacy can work in Myanmar. Allan (2010) describes advances 
in areas such as human trafficking, drug control, disability strategy, 
sustainable forestry, and HIV-Malaria-TB prevention. The Leprosy 
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Mission points to recent invitations for various INGOs to assist in 
drafting legislation surrounding disability, the elderly, and the protection 
of women and children as wins for advocacy (Griffiths, TLMI 2011), 
while President Thein Sein's apparent enthusiasm for the alleviation of 
extreme rural poverty could also be taken as an advocacy win. However, 
progress seems as much related to the particular issue involved as it is 
to the methodology and approach: items related to security or involving 
budgetary reallocations make less progress, while changes related to 
technical matters or local needs are more likely to succeed than calls for 
policy change. For example, despite much advocacy, increases to health 
and education spending have been minimal. 
It is widely agreed that significant progress in development requires 
major policy change. "It [advocacy] is really the main thing we need to do" 
(Lancelot, MOM 2009). Yet most INGOs are //particularly hesitant to pursue 
fully rational advocacy strategies that would do a better job of leading to 
more complete overall development in any sense" (Source 30, 2009). Several 
INGOs acknowledged a lack of understanding of government decision-
making processes as one cause of this, particularly once decisions need 
to go higher than regional or ministry level (Source 18; Source 25, 2009). 
One UN informant argued that, "Most organizations ... don't engage and 
negotiate boldly enough behind closed doors. When we push back non-
confrontationally, but boldly, they generally move closer to a consensus 
or compromise solution" (Source 42, 2009). Yet interviewees from these 
same organizations implied the vulnerability of such work by seeking 
assurances of anonymity for these comments. 
Most advocacy in Myanmar is personal and non-confrontational. One 
respondent spoke of 11Silent advocacy" (Source 20, 2009), by which she 
meant private discussions away from the public spotlight. The Myanmar 
Red Cross speaks of "informal advocacy" or 11Situation-sensitive advocacy" 
(Tha Hla Shwe, MRC 2011). Oxfam prefers to speak of advocacy as 
"building relationships", and notes that success is very dependent upon 
the individuals involved (Win, Oxfam 2009). Indeed, /'the word 'advocacy' 
itself, in some cases, makes people afraid" (Tumbian, WV 2009). 
Advocacy is not so nearly as helpful a term as dialogue. I would much 
rather talk about dialogue and engagement than about advocacy. A Western 
form, a marketing approach, a civil rights-based approach to advocacy 
is simply inappropriate here, but that does not mean you can't have an 
advocacy strategy that uses a whole range of tools and techniques to 
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progress exactly the same messages in a very different way, using very 
different media (Allan, Spectrum 2009). 
The most effective approach appears to be through exploring needs and 
issues together with officials, with no confrontation and no blame, looking 
for ways to meet needs together, particularly at the community and 
township level. 1'It is more like seeking support or seeking to supplement 
what the community has already done to help themselves" (Source 24, 
2009). World Vision explained this advocacy as ureport[ing] needs to 
the government, so they know and so they can support us by sending 
their technical people'' (Tumbian, WV 2009). Effectively, this approach 
adopts methods described in the literature for involving elites in poverty 
alleviation, even when their vested interests lie elsewhere (e.g. see Hossain 
and Moore 2002). 
Our approach is to make them understand what the reality is ... we give 
them real information, bring them to reality, bring them to the field1 so they 
can understand what the reality of the situation is. Why would you make 
other people ashamed? If you want to win, don't make other people feel 
like they have lost (Source 6, 2009). 
One respondent emphasized that many officials at the township level 
are genuinely concerned about many of the same issues as development 
agencies. Advocacy that directly criticizes concerned individuals who are 
hamstrung by small budgets is not helpful (Source 31, 2009). 
Accountability 
Eyben (2008) argues that mutual accountability in international 
development is not so much about parties holding each other to account 
for performance against pre-established objectives, as about the messy 
complexity of relationship and process with mutual responsibility. "Much 
of what proves with hindsight to be effective aid may well be an outcome 
of relational approaches." This conception of accountability appears 
particularly apt in Myanmar, where agencies need to overcome the strained 
relationship between the West and the Myanmar government in order to 
operate effectively. 
INGOs with the greatest ease of access have strong relationships 
with authorities, built largely through highly transparent dealings with 
officials. Many invest significant time and personnel in developing and 
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maintaining relations with government officials (for example, Agland, Care 
2009; Griffiths, TLMI 2009; Purnell, WVI 2011; Tegenfeldt, Hope 2009). 
Transparency is a key: many INGOs are 
even more transparent [than usual] ... The entire thing that is at stake ... 
is to build trust .... So we are absolutely transparent in everything we do 
... we are trying really to build trust with them1 that they see the value of 
us working with them [and] spread that message that international aid ... 
can really bring development and improvement (Lancelot, MDM 2009). 
The Myanmar government is not of course, particularly transparent in 
return. However, that is perhaps sometimes more a matter of bureaucratic 
capacity than intent. f/I don't think they want to be non-transparent/ 
but they don't want to be required to give more than they can provide" 
(Lancelot, MDM 2009). 
Interestingly, however, given the level of transparency in direct 
relationships with officials, INGO reports that are delivered to higher levels 
of authority are not always as transparent. One INGO country director 
complained that officials "have literally said to me, use [your figures and 
information] where you want and when you want, but please, could you 
report it like this and like this" (Source 18, 2009). 
Another explained: 
We tell [departmental contacts] exactly what we are doing and ask for their 
advice on what to put into our written reports- people in the department 
advise back what to write up and what not to write up. It creates more 
trouble for them if we report everything (Source 20, 2009). 
Similarly, at least one INGO leader voiced concern that "INGOs here 
seem to be less open to information sharing [with other INGOs] than we 
found them in [another country L as if they mimic the government and 
become less transparent themselves" (Source 18, 2009). One longer-term 
journalist concurred, suggesting he had noted a much greater reluctance 
for INGOs to go on record and talk about their activities after the purge 
in the military leadership in 2004, and that since then they preferred 
to remain more ''under the radar" (Goddard, MT 2009). Following the 
unprecedented relief cooperation in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, this 
tendency seems to have improved significantly with, for example, eighteen 
agencies cooperating very openly in an impact study after the March 2011 
earthquake, and recent inter-agency discussion of salary scales for local 
staff (Herink, WV 2011). Still, it is interesting that these comments were 
made a full year after the cyclone. 
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In regard to accountability to donors, many respondents readily agreed 
that they maintain a very low publicity profile about their Myanmar 
work in donor countries. "Caution is wise" when it comes to publicising 
projects outside the country, and some country directors are particularly 
careful to advise visitors from other parts of their organization not to 
include anything in their promotional materials that would upset either 
the Myanmar government or people outside Myanmar. In part, this is 
in recognition of the government's sensitivity that portrayals of poverty 
may be exploited by opponents, but it also highlights the complexity of 
accountability towards donors. 
CONTEXT SENSITIVITY IN WORK WITHIN 
LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
Participation 
Participation is a central concept in development theory, having 
"become widely accepted as the minimum requirement for successful 
and sustained development outcomes" (Clarke, 2009). IJ'Empowerment 
happens when individuals and organized groups are able to imagine 
their world differently" and take action to change their circumstances 
(Eyben et al. 2008). 
Political limitations, access issues, and regional conflict mean 
participation is not always implemented well in Myanmar. One Burmese 
manager in a UN agency complained that participatory committees set 
up for most projects "are just user groups that stop at the end of the 
project, leaving again a vacuum" (Source 41, 2009). Nonetheless, many 
other more highly participatory "process-led", "human-centred", and 
"integrated" programmes in Myanmar have created ownership and 
empowered communities to assess their needs, prioritize, and design their 
own solutions, often resulting in the emergence of genuine community-
based organizations (CBOs). 
This finding - that highly participatory development works well 
in Myanmar - is counter-intuitive given the strongly authoritarian 
government. One respondent commented: 
I found myself, in my early time here, amazed that we had the flexibility 
to do what we were doing with so much of this community empowerment 
work. It puzzled me immensely as to why there was never any kickback 
(Allan, Spectrum 2009). 
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Anthropological research by Skidmore (2003, 2004) and Fink (2001) 
highlights another factor that needs to be taken into account. Their research 
investigated the psychological impact of military rule in Myanmar, and 
concluded that people develop an aversion to risk trying new things and 
are disempowered in decision-making. This perception is mirrored in Aung 
San Suu Kyrs (1995) writing. "People here are not willing to try things 
outside areas that are safe" (Goddard, Myanmar Times 2009). 
Certainly, "fear is a significant component of the landscape here ... 
it is very rear' (Tegenfeldt, Hope 2009). There is 'Ja lot of fear of doing 
new things, or of being seen to be taking the lead on things or pushing 
things forward ... there is kind of a status-quo culture ... There is a real 
fear of being clamped down on" (Wells, Paung Ku 2009). Invitations to 
become involved in participatory development, therefore, ''often meet 
with scepticism from village leaders ... worried what this will mean for 
their relationship with local authorities" (Source 20, 2009). "People will 
come together, but thetre not used to making decisions for themselves 
... some of that is due to political repression, and some of it is due to the 
people just being really poor" (Agland, Care 2009). 
Nonetheless, interviewees felt that this fear of the authorities is more 
immobilizing in the political arena, and perhaps more in urban and peri-
urban areas than in village-level development, but that fear and scepticism 
could be overcome. Process is critical, though, and requires leadership and 
a demonstration of approval. 
They need the door opened for them by local senior authorities, village or 
regional, to give them permission before they're willing to move forward .... 
They need to make sure that the link is there .... They need to be reassured 
that what they are doing is acceptable. Here it is more than in other places 
... Here it needs to happen (Agland, Care 2009). 
Such approval is often provided by a key individual in the village, someone 
confident in their position (such as a headman or former headman), with 
high-level relationships, who endorses the process and is able to motivate 
and inspire others (Griffiths, TLMI 2009). 
Good relationships with local officials are often ensured by local partner 
organizations, who can spend "a lot of time talking to local officials to 
convince them this is good for the community and not a threat" (Source 
20, 2009). In other instances, developing such relationships is a learned 
skill that is utilized by key community members, rather than the result 
of deliberate engagement or policy by INGOs or NCO partners: "If you 
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don't liaise with the authorities, then the authorities will follow up what 
you have been doing anyway, so you might as well try to do the right 
thing" (Allan, Spectrum 2009). Where possible, it can be fruitful to include 
officials in projects in such a way that they can consider they helped the 
work and can take some credit for the results- although it can result in 
pressure to implement infrastructure projects, tangible outcomes that local 
authorities can easily take credit for. 
Most INGO respondents suggest that they emphasize high levels of 
participation more strongly in Myanmar than elsewhere. For some it is a 
deliberate effort to build highly democratic grass-roots practices, to prepare 
the way for a more democratic national future (Source 24; Source 41, 2009). 
Most pointed to high levels of volunteerism, self-reliance, self-motivation, 
and independence within the culture, demonstrated by the local response 
to Cyclone Nargis, as making highly participatory programmes particularly 
suitable in Myanmar (Source 24, 2009; Tegenfeldt, Hope 2009; Tumbian, 
WV 2009; Wells,. Paung Ku 2009). 
Equity 
Equity is a fundamental element of effective participatory development, 
and requires that the disempowered be given the opportunity to provide 
input into decision-making processes. Equity is usually emphasized in 
terms of gender, but more broadly urequires the voices of women, the 
young, the old, and landless,. disabled, and other marginalized groups 
[alongside] the voices of traditional leaders, religious leaders, and 
landowners" (Clarke 2009). Equitable development, therefore, also needs 
to be sensitive to mitigation of fault lines within society which drive 
exclusion and marginalization (Conflict Sensitivity 2004; Carment and 
Schnabel 2001). 
Equity is a significant issue in Myanmar. uThe result of living under 
such a system of strict hierarchy, is that they are not used to being able 
to have a say in the development of their own villagel/ (Source 20, 2009). 
Building equity and genuine participation in such a a deeply fractured 
society" (Wells, Paung Ku 2009) requires time and deliberate effort to 
empower the voices of women, minorities, and the marginalized. 
Hope International Development Agency is possibly the INGO that most 
directly addresses these concerns in Myanmar. Its representative argues: 
[Westerners] characterize this country as a peace-loving Buddhist people 
who have the misfortune to be ruled by some military thugs.... I see 
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this, in contrast, as a country that has a long, deep and broad history of 
violence, and the use of violence and the threat of violence to maintain 
social control.. .. It is in the family, it is in community organizations, it is 
in religious organizations, and of course it is in the military (Tegenfeldt, 
Hope 2009). 
Consequently, most poor people defer to village leaders, religious 
leaders, or to local members of the regime-connected Union Solidarity 
Development Association (USDA) or of the military, for example, rather 
than offering genuine participation. Dealing with the root causes of 
authoritarianism and marginalization is essential for improving equity in 
development; empowerment must facilitate personal transformation that 
results in people coming to see one another in more mutually respectful 
relationships (Tegenfeldt, Hope 2009). It must help communities develop 
good communication, negotiation, mediation, and consensus decision-
making skills. 
In order to improve equity, it is essential not only to address gender 
issues, but also to reduce suspicion between groups and build participation 
that demonstrates development is not just for one ethnic, religious, or 
political group (Tegenfeldt, Hope 2009). For example, one INGO reported 
coming under pressure several years ago to exclude known supporters 
of the National League for Democracy (NLD) from eligibility for its 
microfinance loans (Source 31, 2009). The Myanmar Red Cross came 
under similar pressure at one point to exclude NLD supporters even when 
taking blood donations (Tha Hla Shwe, MRC 2011). However, Western 
INGOs sometimes equally discriminate against members of the regime-
affiliated USDA (Salai, Swissaid 2009). It was not uncommon for villages 
to choose USDA members as part of village development committees, 
and INGOs were often very concerned about their political affiliation. 
Given that the USDA has since been converted into the Union Solidarity 
Development Party, the new ruling party in Myanmar, their concerns 
were well founded. Clearly, if the election of USDA members was due to 
deference by community members out of a sense of hierarchy and power, 
this would be reason for concern. 
There is evidence in the literature that good accountability processes 
and highly democratic decision-making can be a safeguard against elite 
capture of community-driven development, despite the presence of 
elites on committees (Fritzen 2007; Labonne and Chase 2009; Platteau 
and Gaspari 2003). In the same way that INGOs must strive to ensure 
that committees include women as well as some of the poorest and most 
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vulnerable persons in a community, several respondents were adamant 
that the principles of equity also mean USDA members must not be 
excluded simply because of political affiliation (for example, Win, Oxfam 
2009). Likewise, considerations of equity mean that village and religious 
leaders should also be included in participatory processes, not completely 
sidelined (Tumbian, WV 2009). 
Sustainabi I ity 
In an environment where international agencies are restricted in building 
the capacity of township officials, it is difficult to ensure that officials are 
able to maintain village-level development. Sustainable development 
therefore requires that communities should be able to maintain their own 
development themselves, beyond the life of the project. A number of 
agencies thus have a deliberate goal of building equitable, participatory 
village development committees into community-based organizations, 
able to continue the process of community empowerment and sustainable 
development long after the involvement of the international or local 
agency. These agencies assess this strategy as having been effective 
in Myanmar: 
We have proven on the ground that the poor, if given opportunity, can fully 
participate in prioritizing their needs and work together with the project in 
shaping their lives .... If these groups are given proper support guidance 
and training can be a springboard to the emergence of community-based 
organizations (Source 41, 2009). 
Part of the reason why this is possible appears to be that, rather than most 
people living a learned dependency, "it is just the complete opposite: most 
people are not expecting any help from anybody and assume they are just 
going to have to do it themselves" (Wells, Paung Ku 2009). 
However, it takes considerable time to develop the capacity of village 
committees so they can become firmly-based CBOs. While the approach 
and programme of each agency is different, agencies interviewed by the 
author suggested that in their experience it takes between seven (Source 41, 
2009) to fifteen years (Tumbian, WV 2009) to develop a functioning CBO 
in a village community. Two other INGO leaders with prior experience of 
just-commencing programmes suggested they believed it could be achieved 
in as little as three years if it was made the central focus of the intervention 
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and done intensively with a facilitator living within the community (Source 
24, 2009; Source 30, 2009). It was also noted that success in such a venture 
"depends largely on whether committee members are assigned by the 
village, or whether people with a real heart, spirit and genuine leadership 
character are brought into the committee" (Source 41, 2009). 
Active Citizenship 
Active citizenship is widely seen as the logical conclusion of highly 
participatory development, when communities and local NGOs own their 
development initiatives, advocate for themselves, and hold authorities 
to account to sustain development (Clarke, 2009). Given the surprising 
finding that, despite the high degree of authoritarianism in the country, 
the most effective development programmes in Myanmar are strongly 
participatory and inclusive, one might suspect effective programmes may 
also incorporate a high degree of active citizenship. 
Respondents were very conscious that empowerment must do no 
harm and not put people or communities at risk. They are also very aware 
that most Burmese are very reluctant to challenge authorities at any level 
(Goddard, Myanmar Times 2009), or even to talk about issues they perceive 
as relating to higher levels of authority (Wells, Paung Ku 2009). Indeed, 
there is "a lot of evidence that the government views the people as the 
enemy, that they fear the public, and fear the public doing too much" 
(Long, Myanmar Times 2009). 
Speaking about local NGO and CBO networks, Dorning lamented 
that, "What we can't do here, but would be possible in other countries is 
... they could become political in themselves, they could lobby for their 
own constituency" (Dorning, Burnet 2009). Most INGOs discouraged any 
politicization of their work in villages or of their local partners, and most 
attempts even to facilitate local NGOs in lobbying donors and international 
authorities were unsuccessfuL Instead, apart from communities actively 
seeking cooperation from local officials through lines of relationship, INGOs 
largely assume the role of advocacy on their behalf. Indeed, some INGOs 
avoid even using the term "empowerment" in their communication with 
the government (Source 6, 2009). 
This finding is consistent with research in places where active 
citizenship may put people in danger. Clarke (2009), for example, argues 
that participation has become "fetishised to some degree", such that it is 
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considered the overriding factor in all development interventions, and that 
consequently active citizenship is also widely assumed to be optimal in 
all circumstances. Instead, using the example of illegal Burmese workers 
in Thailand, Clarke argues that active citizenship may not be possible 
(or optimal) where public participation could endanger lives, and where 
people do not have the supporting legal and political mechanisms for 
such a role. In such situations INGOs should assume such a role on their 
behalf, as they have in Myanmar. 
However, since the recent elections and inauguration of the new 
president and parliament, there appears to be a decided change in the 
level of local advocacy and active citizenship. Local NGOs have become far 
bolder in using the public civil space to engage in public debate of policy 
issues, something previously heavily restricted. For example, discussion 
of the Kachin State hydroelectricity dams is becoming common even in 
Yangon; local groups have organized regular seminars in Dawei calling 
for corporate social responsibility in relation to the deep-sea port; and the 
Ayeyawady River Awareness campaign by a Yangon-based group is using 
media and art to raise issues of watershed and environmental management 
within the Ayeyawady basin (Wells, Paung Ku 2011). This is a new level 
of locally-led active citizenship within the country, and something INGOs 
have yet to significantly engage with. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has documented many of the complexities INGOs face in 
implementing their development programmes sensitively in Myanmar 
in order to facilitate greater effectiveness. While there is broad consensus 
that poverty in Myanmar is largely the result of governance failures, the 
difficulties faced by INGOs relate to restrictions stemming from both the 
Myanmar government and the international community. Nonetheless, 
despite the complexity and difficulties, if INGOs operate with appropriate 
sensitivity to the context,. their effectiveness is not as heavily restricted as 
is commonly perceived by those outside the country. This is particularly 
true for projects that directly address the impact of extreme poverty on 
communities, but also applies in areas such as advocacy and developing 
the capacity of the emerging civil society. 
This chapter has summarized the major insights obtained from key 
development practitioners working in Myanmar about the types of 
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contextualization that make INGO development interventions most 
effective. The insights from their experience provide something of a 
blueprint for other organizations working in Myanmar, and offer hope for 
incremental change and effectiveness in alleviating the impact of extreme 
poverty in Myanmar. More broadly, this research highlights the clear need 
for development practitioners to be ready to adapt global development 
approaches to local circumstances. It points to the lack of substantive 
research into the contextualization of development, and the tendency of the 
international and academic community to espouse a global ideal without 





I conducted semi-structured interviews in person with fifty key practitioners 
between 2009 and 2011. Most were country directors or programme 
managers with INGOs and UN organizations based in Myanmar. 
I also interviewed a number of local NGO leaders, as well as leaders of 
INGOs who work into Myanmar through partnerships, and a couple 
of representatives from bilateral donor organizations and journalists. 
A majority of those interviewed were non-Burmese, reflecting the make-up 
of senior INGO and UN organization staff. 
Most interviews were conducted face-to-face in Myanmar and Thailand, 
after Cyclone Nargis and the referendum in 2008 but before the 2010 
elections were scheduled. Interviews were around one hour in length, and 
were guided by a loose schedule of open-ended questions. Most interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. The initial data analysis was verified using 
a Delphi panel discussion in Yangon during December 2009, with a number 
of follow-up interviews conducted during June 2011. 
All respondents have been given an anonymous reference number 
(Source 1-50), while about half the participants agreed to allow at least 
some of their responses to be on the record. The latter are noted by in-text 
citations providing author, agency, and date. 
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